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Abstract: This paper aims to test the existence of vertical interactions in terms of public spending between 
overlapping local jurisdictions in France using a data set of 110 French municipalities and their corresponding 
departments in 2001 and 2005. To do so, we consider that demand for municipal services is conditioned by the 
services provided by departments.  We then estimate two specifications which allow spatial heterogeneity to be 
modeled and which are compared with a simple spatial error specification (without spatial heterogeneity). The 
two  estimated  spatial  regimes  models  are  able  to  eradicate  spatial  autocorrelation  in  the  error  term.  The 
estimation results show that an appropriate consideration of spatial heterogeneity can lead to new insights. The 
spatial error specification reveals a robust complementary demand relationship between services provided by 
departmental and municipal governments. However, these results are not in accord with the results produced by 
the spatial regime models, which provide evidence of heterogeneity with independence, complementarity  or 
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In  every  country  with  a  decentralized  form  of  government,  there  are  multiple  tiers  of 
government  services  that  may  interact  at  the  local  level.  This  multi-tiered  form  of 
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organization often is viewed as being economically  inefficient because different levels of 
government may provide similar or related services. If evidence is found to support this view, 
it will have important implications  for debates over decentralization and the provision of 
public sector services at the local level. 
In economics literature, inflation in total local public spending is assumed to be produced by a 
complementary effect, that is to say a vertical positive interaction between demands for public 
services  provided  by  overlapping  jurisdictions  (Turnbull  and  Djoundourian  (1993)).  The 
provision of public services then depends on the preferences of the median voter. At the 
lowest (municipal) level, it is assumed that the local incumbent adopts policies in the median 
voter’s interest, taking into account public spending decisions at the next higher level (in the 
USA, for example, the county). A complementary relation appears as the median voter would 
increase her demand for municipal public goods when public spending at the county level 
increases. Therefore, if expenditures at one level are a complement to expenditures at the 
other level, the overlapping structure increases the size of the local public sector. 
 
This model usually is implemented empirically by estimating a demand for municipal public 
expenditures function conditional on county expenditures in the spirit of Pollack (1971). To 
our knowledge, three articles examine the existence of such a complementary effect without 
explicitly  considering  the  spatial  dimensions  of  their  data.  Studying  general  purpose 
expenditures  in  U.S.  municipalities  and  counties,  Turnbull  and  Djoundourian  (1993)  and 
Campbell  (2004)  find  that  municipal  per  capita  expenditures  and  county  per  capita 
expenditures are complementary
2. Using panel data for Sweden over the period  1981-1986, 
Aronsson  et  al  (2000)  also  find  a  positive  correlation  between  county  and  municipal 
expenditures.  Revelli  (2003)  alone  includes  spatial  autocorrelation  among  district 
expenditures in the specification. He observes a spatial vertical externality among county and 
district expenditures and shows the importance of taking into account both vertical and 
horizontal externalities into the demand for public services function at the lowest level. 
 
In light of these findings, this article aims to expand upon the existing literature in two ways. 
First, we analyze for the first time the links between the two most important levels of local 
government (eg municipal and departmental) in France. The conditional demand function 
then is estimated on a cross-sectional sample of French municipalities and their departments, 
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taking into account the spatial dependence among municipal public expenditures. Second, in 
the aforementioned studies, the authors focus on a global demand specification, with the same 
coefficient for all of the statistical units. The second innovative feature of this article therefore 
is to introduce spatial heterogeneity in the conditional demand function that is estimated. 
Spatial heterogeneity is relevant when data are obtained for a cross-section of spatial units, 
Anselin (1992).  In practice, spatial heterogeneity can be reflected by heteroskedasticity in the 
error  term,  coefficients  varying  with  the  location,  or  both.  Due  to  historical  and  cultural 
differences  at  the  regional  level,  France  is  known  to  be  characterized  by  strong  spatial 
heterogeneity. The country’s territory therefore can be divided into a periphery constituted by 
a group of different regions and a core constituted by ‘Ile de France’, the area around and 
including the capital, Paris. 
This article is therefore an original contribution to empirical regional science literature, and 
uses  a  dataset  covering  all  of  the  largest  French  municipalities  (except  Paris)  and  their 
corresponding  departments  for  two  different  years:  2001  and  2005.  We  first  estimate  a 
standard spatial error model, and find a complementary effect. However, once we include 
spatial  heterogeneity  in  our  econometric  specification  (considering  two  different  spatial 
divisions of France), we find evidence of independence between departmental and municipal 
spending decisions.  ‘Ile de France’ is the only French region systematically characterized by 
a  complementary  effect.  Therefore,  we  agree  Anselin  (1990)  as  the  presence  of  spatial 
heterogeneity has implications for the generality of regional science theories.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the theoretical framework, and in 
Section 3, we develop the empirical methodology without including spatial heterogeneity. In 
Section 4, we present the empirical findings of the two spatial regimes specifications and in 
Section 5, we present our conclusions. 
 
2. Conditional demand for municipal public services 
 
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) and Aronsson et al (2000) developed a model of municipal 
expenditures which assumes that municipal expenditures are conditioned by the expenditures 
at  the  next  higher  level,  the  county.  They  assume  that  the  median  voter  utility  function 
depends on private consumption x and public services provided at the municipal level  m z  and 
o
c z at the county level (subscript m and c refer to municipal and county variables respectively).      
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Maximizing the utility function under budget constraint, Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) 
and Aronsson et al (2000)  derive the conditional demand for municipal public services: 
 
(1) 




m m m z p y z z  
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m y can be measured  by the income of the median municipal voter less the taxes she pays at 
the county level. 
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c m b   is the median voter (residential) tax base shared by the municipality and its county.  m b is 
the    average  municipal  tax  base,  including  the  local  business  tax  (respectively  c b for  the 






can be defined as the proportion of the tax burden associated with 
residential property. Tax price also includes unit costs of public services and the size of the 
population to deal with congestion effects. 
The linkages between the two levels of local jurisdictions come from two different effects 
which are called income and preferences (or taste) effects. The impact of additional county 
level expenditure on the demand for the municipal public goods can be analyzed through this 
first-order condition: 
(3) 
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ij U  is the second order partial derivatives of 
utility with respect to i and j (x: private consumption, m: municipal and c: county). 
Income effect easily can be identified. If the municipal public goods and services are normal, 
an increase in the public services at the county level financed by a tax on the median voter 
will reduce the median voter’s income and then her demand for municipal public services. 
Preferences effect is indeterminate and depends on the cross partial derivatives of the utility 
function: 
(4) 
















Services provided at the two different levels of the local public sector can be considered as 
complements,  substitutes  or independent  by the median voter. When larger allocations  of 
county goods increase the willingness of the median voter to pay for municipal public goods, 
the goods are considered to be complements. This is referred to as the complementary effect.  
In  contrast,  when  increases  in  county  services  decrease  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution 
between  municipal  public  services  and  private  consumption,  then  county  and  municipal 
services are considered to be substitutes. 
Formally,  the  conditional  expenditure  function  estimated  for  municipal  services  can  be 
expressed as: 
(5)     
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p m  
Where    is the error  term.  Price and income elasticities of demand are obtained using 
parameters  pand  y respectively, and mean values of median income and tax share. The 
parameter   accounts for the influence of pu blic spending at a higher level (eg county) on 
municipal  public  expenditure.  If  0 ˆ ,  the  two  public  goods  are  considered  to  be 
complements  whereas  0 ˆ   reflects  a  substitute  relationship.  We  consider  them  to  be 
independent or unrelated if the coefficient is not significant. 
In  such  a  specification,  which  does  not  consider  spatial  heterogeneity,  the  parameters 
   s '   and     ,   ,   , p 0 y  are assumed to be constant across municipalities.  X includes control 
variables to deal with differences in unit costs for providing local public services and the 
specific characteristics of a municipal population. 
 
3. Empirical modeling of demand for public services without spatial heterogeneity 
 
We first offer a brief description of the local public sector in France and introduce the data 
selected for empirical analysis. Next, we present specification tests and the estimation results 
of equation (5) are discussed. 
 
3.1 Overview of the organization of the local public sector in France 
 
The local public sector includes 4 overlapping administrative divisions in France. In order 
from the lowest level up, there are 36,680 municipalities, 2,599 groups of municipalities, 100 
departments, and 22 metropolitan regions.  
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Municipalities and departments, which were created in 1790 after the French revolution, form 
the two lowest levels of local government in France. They finance 90% of total local spending 
(60%  financed  by  municipalities  and  inter-municipal  groups  and  30%  financed  by 
departments).  In  2001,  the  median  population  of  a  French  department  was  511,012 
inhabitants, which is 21 times larger than the median population of a U.S county. 
Following the implementation of decentralization laws in the 1980s, municipalities provide a 
wide range of major public services: running water, garbage collection, primary education, 
public transport in the municipal area, town planning. In addition, municipalities are the most 
important public investor in France (before the national  government). Investments mainly 
focus  on  school  buildings,  community  facilities  and  municipal  roads.  Departments  are 
specialized in providing decentralized welfare benefits, which account for more than 60% of 
their total spending (minimum benefits paid to those with no other means of support or to 
those concerned by the loss of independence, for example). 
For the period under study, the French local public sector has experienced two important 
reforms.  First,  Since 2000, many municipalities have joined together to form  cooperative 
groups, referred to in the remainder of this article as inter-communal organizations, to provide 
services to their respective communities. In 1999, 52% of French municipalities belonged to 
an inter-communal organization; this figure rose to 88% in 2005 and 95% in 2011. Inter-
communal organizations are able to increase the variety of services provided at the municipal 
level. Second, in 2003 new decentralization laws have transferred new responsabilities to the 
local authorities.  
 
3.2 Data description 
 
Data are provided by the French Ministries of the Economy and Interior. To address the issue 
of  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  population  size,  we  concentrate  on  the  largest  French 
municipalities.  Paris, Corsica and the 5 overseas departments of France were excluded due to 
their  unique  features.  Sample  data  therefore  covers  110  French  municipalities  with  over 
50,000 inhabitants and their corresponding departments (87 departments). We consider here 
two different years, 2001 and 2005, to check for the robustness of our results.  
The dependent variable is measured by the operating expenditures plus gross saving which 
cover  the  repayment  of  loans  coming  from  past  investments.  Such  an  approach  seems 
desirable with cross-section data because the investment expenditures are discontinued in the  
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time dimension. We also use the same measure of aggregate expenditures per capita at the 
department level. 
The income effect is measured by using the median income less residential department taxes. 
The median income is computed with the distribution of the taxable income of households in 
the municipality. It should be noted that welfare benefits are non-taxable income. As grants 
from the central government are the second most important revenue stream, we also include 
national grant per capita. 
Tax share is measured by the municipal residential property tax base divided by the total tax 
base (including the local business tax).  This variable accounts for the direct influence of 
taxation on the choices of the median voter. It denotes the share of taxes between firms and 
households. The ratio is near 1 in residential areas, while it tends towards 0 in industrial areas. 
Following the standard procedure in empirical related literature, we use control variables to 
deal  with  differences  in  unit  costs  for  providing  local  public  services  and  the  specific 
characteristics of municipal populations. 
We initially used several control variables such as the number of recipients of welfare benefits 
or  of  secondary  school  pupils,  and  the  number  of  social  housing  units.  However,  as 
insignificant values of some parameters were obtained in a preliminary step, we removed 
these explanatory variables. The set of variables that finally were used, measured in 2001 and 
2005, and summary statistics are presented in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 
Data set description, French municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants in 2001 and 2005 
(Euros) 
Description of variables  Mean  Min  Max 
2001  2005  2001  2005  2001  2005 
Total municipal expenditures per capita  1,135  1,139  664  731  2,776  3,137 
Total expenditures  per capita in 
departments 
551  772  379  576  764  992 
After tax yearly median municipal  
income 
10,172  9,934  6,707  5,743  22,133  35,938 
Tax share  0.20  0.25  0.11  0.12  0.35  0.41 
National grant per capita  341  366  176  187  656  841 
Municipal population  107,265  107,377  50,070  50,070  807,070  807,071 




Table 1 shows steady values between 2001 and 2005 for most variables except department 
expenditures per capita, which increased from 551 to 772 Euros, on average. This can be 
explained  by  decentralization  laws  in  2003  which  transferred  new  responsibilities  to  the 
departments. 
 
3.3 Specification tests 
 
Econometric  issues  influence  the  choice  of  the  estimator  in  our  model  (5).  One  issue  is 
whether  department  expenditures  can  be  considered  to  be  exogenous  in  the  municipal 
conditional expenditure function. The second issue is whether spatial autocorrelation should 
be included. 
 
3.3.1  Endogeneity of department expenditures 
 
In  equation  (5),  department  expenditures  are  likely  to  be  endogenous  to  municipal 
expenditures  if  the  department  and  the  municipal  public  spending  decisions  occur 
simultaneously. We therefore have to implement a diagnostic test for endogeneity using an 
appropriate set of instruments. 
In the spirit of the median voter model, tax share and after-tax median income, both measured 
at  the  department  level,  may  be  used  as  instruments  for  department  expenditures.  Since 
departments  provide  welfare  benefits  and  support  to  those  concerned  by  a  loss  of 
independence, we also use the numbers of recipients of social benefits, the number of social 
housing units, the unemployment rate, and the percentage of people over the age of 60. The 
number of municipalities (urban and rural), national grants per capita, and the number of 
secondary school pupils also are instruments considered for department expenditures. 
An  instrumental  variable  must  satisfy  two  requirements.  It  must  be  correlated  with  the 
endogenous variable and be orthogonal to the error term. We therefore used the Bound et al 
(1995)  test  to  select  relevant  instruments  and  performed  the  Sargan  test  to  choose  valid 
instruments
3. The resulting set of relevant and valid instruments for department  expenditures 
are population, unemployment rate and the number of rural municipalities. Finally, according 
to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity (probability  greater than 0.26), we cannot 
                                                 
3 These tests were implemented with Stata10. See Baum and Schaffer (2003) for more details.   
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reject the hypothesis that department expenditures are exogenous in the municipal expenditure 
equation. This means that the median municipal voter considers department spending to be as 
given. Therefore, we do not need to instrument the department expenditures to estimate the 
single equation (5). 
 
3.3.2  Spatial dependence 
 
Our study focuses on vertical interactions between two overlapping local jurisdictions, but we 
also are interested in spatial horizontal interactions resulting from the behavior of incumbent 
municipal authorities (fiscal competition and yardstick competition). Corresponding statistical 
inference  is  based  on  different  tests  to  detect  spatial  dependence  (Moran’s  I,  Lagrange 
Multipliers, Kelejian and Robinson (KR) test that does not require normality for the error 
terms)
4. 
As the municipalities under study do not share a common border, we considered two spatial 
weights  matrices.  The  first  is  a  function  of  inverse  (euclidean)  distance  between  two 
municipalities. The second reflects the potential spatial interaction (in terms of competition) 
between  two  nearby  a nd  similar  municipalities.  It  takes  the  value  of  one  if  the  two 
municipalities belong to the same European NUTS1 region. We assume here that fiscal 
competition (through local public spending or taxes) mainly concerns municipalities located 
in the same Euro pean region. According to Newman and Sullivan (1988), once firms or 
households choose a region (the macro-localization choice), they then choose a municipality 
inside this region (the micro-localization choice). 
Table 2 shows the diagnostics for spatial ef fects, considering each row-standardized weight 
matrix and each year: 
Table 2 
 Spatial dependence tests (probability) 
Test  NUTS1 weight matrix  Inverse distance weight 
matrix 
Year  2001  2005  2001  2005 
SARMA  0.26  0.40  0.10  0.008 
Moran’s I  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.0006 
Lmerr  0.32  0.18  0.44  0.043 
                                                 





0.51  0.077  0.81  0.08 
LM lag  0.49  0.67  0.21  0.11 
Robust LM lag  0.19  0.94  0.145  0.10 
Robust LM err  0.13  0.20  0.08  0.007 
 
Whatever the weight matrix or year considered, Moran’s I tests are significant and we are 
inclined to reject the null hypothesis of absence of spatial autocorrelation in the error term (at 
the 10% level). SARMA tests confirm this diagnostic with the inverse distance matrix only. 
If we consider the inverse distance weight matrix, as we never reject the null hypothesis for 
the Lmlag and RLMlag tests, we decide to dismiss the spatial lag specification, whatever the 
year  considered.  Results  obtained  with  the  Lmerr  and  KR  err  tests  are  more  contrasted. 
However, we decide to retain a Spatial Error model (SEM) for the two years considered. 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
 
The following table gives estimation results obtained for the years 2001 and 2005, using both 
an  OLS  method  (with  robust  standard  errors  (se)  to  deal  with  heteroskedasticity)  and  a 
maximum likelihood estimation if we consider the spatial error model (SEM). 
Table 3  
Estimation results without spatial heterogeneity (inverse distance weight matrix) 
Variables  Coefficient estimates (probability) 
Year  2001  2005 
Estimation method  OLS 
robust se 




Spatial error model 






































































Autoregressive coefficient    0.49 
(0.03)** 
  0.57 
(0.004)*** 
AIC  1462  1451  1402  1398 
Breush Pagan probability  0.000***  0.0006***  0.000***  0.000*** 
Significance level: ***  for 1%, ** for 5 % and * for 10 %. 
 
The best model is the SEM with the lowest value for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The results are similar to those of other studies, with  ˆ  positive and significant in 2001 and 
2005. This may suggest that the welfare benefits provided by departments are complementary 
to many of the services provided by municipalities. 
However,  the  coefficient  becomes  smaller  in  2005  (from  0.95  in  2001  to  0.35  in  2005). 
Therefore,  we  observe  a  decrease  of  the  strength  of  the  vertical  interaction  among 
municipalities and their departments between 2001 and 2005. One explanation key could be 
the development of inter-communal organizations which has increased the variety of services 
provided by municipalities. Therefore, it seems that the department’ specificity in terms of 
providing the decentralized welfare repayment would become less visible.  
Concerning  other  results,  all  of  the  significant  coefficients  present  the  appropriate 
sign. Results thus reveal a negative and significant impact of population size on per capita 
local public expenditures. An increase of 1000 inhabitants results in a decrease of 5 euros in 
per  capita  expenditures  in  2001  (and  a  decrease  of  4  euros  in  2005).  This  confirms  the 
existence of economies of scale in consumption. The introduction of the number of secondary 
residences is a proxy used to capture costs of public investment in terms of tourism or leisure. 
Estimates show that an increase of 100 secondary residences in 2005 generates an increase of 
around 3.4 euros in per capita total municipal spending. 
Values for price and income elasticities (respectively -0.15 and 0 on average) reveal a weakly 
elastic  publicly  provided  goods  and  services  in  the  biggest  French  municipalities.  
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Furthermore,  empirical  results  indicate  that  the  coefficient  relating  to  the  inter-communal 
organization dummy variable (which is equal to 1 when the municipality does not belong to 
an inter-communal organization) is positive and significant in 2005 only. Next, results show 
that per capita national  grants received by the municipality increase public spending in a 
greater proportion than an equivalent rise in local income (flypaper effect). 
However,  the  Breush  Pagan-test  reveals  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity,  and  as 
suggested by Anselin (1992), an indication of heteroskedasticity may point to the need for a 
more explicit incorporation of spatial heterogeneity in the form of spatial regimes. Cross-
region  variations  of  the  parameters  therefore  were  included  in  the  specification  and  are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
4. Empirical modeling of demand for public services with spatial heterogeneity 
 
To  introduce  spatial  heterogeneity  in  the  conditional  demand  specification  (5),  we  use  a 
spatial regimes model. Each regime is characterized by different values for the coefficients 
associated to price, income and department expenditures. The number of regimes is defined 
by the spatial division of the French territory into regions.  The two different spatial regimes 
specifications  used are described and discussed in  the first  subsection.  In the second, we 
present and discuss the estimation results obtained. 
 
 
4.1 Spatial division of the French territory 
 
French  regions  traditionally  have  been  characterized  by  historical,  cultural  and  economic 
differences. Like other countries (see for example Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010) in Belgium), 
France is not a homogeneous nation, and consequently is particularly well suited for spatial 
heterogeneity studies. We propose here to divide the French territory, grouping contiguous 
French  administrative  regions
5  together  and  by  differentiating  ‘Ile  de  France’  from  other 
regions. Ile de France (IDF), which includes Paris, is one French administrative region; it 
usually is considered to be different from all of the other regions. IDF is characterized by a 
high  regional  growth  rate,  high  population  density,  high  level  education  and  a  weak 
                                                 
5 A finer spatial division, into the 22 French administrative regions, is not possible as the numbers of 
municipalities and departments in each region would be too small to allow an econometric analysis.    
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percentage  of  municipalities  belonging  to  an  inter-communal  organization.  Another 
distinctive feature is that departments and municipalities in IDF co-finance large expenditures 
in terms of transport networks, in particular. 
To test the robustness of our results, we consider two different ways of dividing the territory 
of France: 
- IDF/NORTH/SOUTH regimes 
- Seven French European constituencies 
Tests for the presence of structural instability have been implemented to justify the spatial 
divisions considered. The null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same in all regimes have 
been rejected for these two partitions of the French territory. 
 
4.1.1  IDF/NORTH/SOUTH regimes 
 
Two  of  these  three  regimes  (North,  South  and  IDF)  include  several  French 
administrative regions and respectively 32 (IDF), 47 (North), and 31 (South) municipalities. 
The  regimes  also  reflect  the  cultural,  linguistic,  and  administrative  differences  that 
characterize regions in France, some of which date back to the Roman Empire. Furthermore, 
Table 4 shows that total municipal and departmental expenditures per capita are greater in 
jurisdictions located in IDF and in territories in the South compared with territories in the 
North. 
Table 4 
Average values, Ile De France, North and South divisions in 2005. 
Variables  Ile de France  North  South 
Total municipal expenditures 
per capita (Euros) 
1,427  953  1,124 
Total department expenditures 
per capita (Euros) 
853  692  812 
After tax yearly median 
municipal  income (Euros) 
11,047  7,724  8,590  
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Tax share  0.26  0.23  0.26 
 
Such a difference in expenditure levels can be explained by different regional traditions 
(higher preferences for local public services in the South and IDF compared to the North) 
and by the highest income level and population density in municipalities located in Ile de 
France. Therefore, they provide a wider range of public services than in other regions (zoo 
effect, Oates (1988)). These statistics also suggest that the dependent variable under study 
is differentiated in space, and confirm the pertinence of the IDF, North and South spatial 
divisions. 
4.1.2  Seven French European constituencies 
 
The French territory is divided into seven different constituencies for European elections.  
The seven constituencies, which are similar to NUTS1 European regions, include respectively 
32 (IDF), 13 (East), 13 (North-West), 16 (West), 10 (South-West), 8 (Centre), 18 (South-East) 
municipalities. This regime provides a finer spatial division than that discussed above. 
The following table describes public spending levels at the municipal and departmental levels 
in each constituency: 
Table 5 
  Average values, seven constituencies in 2005. 






After tax yearly median 
municipal  income 
(Euros) 
Tax share 
Ile de France  1,427  853  11,047  0.26 
East  922  666  7,785  0.24 
North West  938  748  7,033  0.19 
West  987  663  8,144  0.25  
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South West  1,051  817  8,431  0.25 
Centre  948  730  8,036  0.24 
South East  1,200  817  8,764  0.26 
 
These statistics confirm that the South, Centre, and Ile de France tend to spend more than 
other regions. 
Based on these spatial divisions of the French territory, we estimate in the next subsection, 
spatial regimes models. 
 
4. 2 Empirical results 
 




Table 6 gives estimation results obtained for the years 2001 and 2005, using an OLS method 
with robust standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity: 
Table 6 
Estimation results with spatial heterogeneity, IDF/North/South 
(probability into brackets) 
 
Year  2001  2005 
Estimation method  OLS robust 
standard error 
OLS robust standard 
error 

































































Adjusted R²  0.78  0.89 
AIC  1433  1390 
Breush Pagan probability  0.011**  0.000027*** 
Moran’s I probability  0.44  0.77 
SARMA probability  0.55  0.52 
Significance level: *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%. 
 
The spatial regimes specification permits spatial autocorrelation to be removed, as suggested 
by the Moran’s I and Sarma tests. Spatial autocorrelation in the error term can stem from the 
structural instability of coefficients of the demand model. The spatial regimes model is able to 
eradicate spatial autocorrelation in the error term. 
Results  obtained in  2001 and 2005 are  robust.  They  show that the nature of the vertical 
relationships  between  departmental  and  the  municipal  spending  decisions  is  prone  to  be 
different in  Ile de France compared with other spatial divisions. These results reveal that  
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complementarities between services provided by municipalities and departments concern only 
Ile de France (IDF), with a coefficient that becomes smaller in 2005 (from 1.02 in 2001 to 
0.55 in 2005). In contrast, municipalities and their departments seem to have independent 
public spending decisions in the South and North spatial divisions. As mentioned previously, 
those contrasting results can be explained by the high urbanization level in IDF where the 
range of public services is higher than in other regions.  Indeed, in  IDF, departments and 
municipalities co-finance high network spending (for example garbage collection, running 
water, regional transport network), which probably explains the significant complementary 
effect. 
Whatever the year considered, insignificant coefficients obtained for the tax share reveal price 
elasticities equal to 0 in the South and North spatial divisions. The significant value obtained 
in  IDF  reveals  a  weak  price  elasticity  equal  to  -0.15.  In  contrast,  income  elasticities  are 
significant  only  in  the  North  and  South  and  in  2005  (respectively  0.44  and  0.38).  Other 
estimated coefficients also have values similar to the one obtained before. 
 
Overall, we find clear evidence that the vertical effects between spending decisions differ 
over the French territory. Results confirm the spatial heterogeneity in the preferences effect. 
 
4.2.2  Seven French European constituencies 
 
Table 7 reports final OLS estimates (with a heteroscedastic-consistent matrix) of the spatial 
regimes specification resulting from the spatial divisions into seven constituencies: 
Table 7  
Estimation results with spatial heterogeneity, 7 French European constituencies 
(probability into brackets) 
 
Year  2001  2005 
Estimation method  OLS robust standard error  OLS robust standard error 








Municipal population  -0.0042  -0.0041  
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(0.001)***  (0.0026)*** 










































































NORTH WEST department per capita spending  0.51  -0.56  
20 
 
(0.135)  (0.022)** 
















Adjusted R²  0.81  0.88 
AIC  1449  1402 
Breush Pagan probability  0.035**  0.002 
Moran’s I probability  0.24  0.95 
SARMA probability  0.73  0.16 
 
Significance level: *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%. 
 
Once again, we observe that both the Moran’s I and SARMA tests show no evidence 
of  spatial  dependence.  We  also  find  support  for  spatial  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  the 
preferences  effect  across  French  constituencies.  We  observe  a  highly  significant 
complementary effect for Ile de France in 2001 and 2005 and for South-West and South-East 
in 2001 only. In contrast, in 2005 only, the North-West regime is characterized by a negative 
relationship  between  municipal  and  departmental  expenditures  indicating  substitutability 
among public spending at the two levels of local government. Other constituencies (Centre, 
East and West) show no significant vertical effect, indicating independence between local 
public  spending  decisions  of  the  municipal  and  departmental  tiers.  This  confirms  the 
importance of spatial heterogeneity in the analysis of the preferences effect.  
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The coefficients associated to other variables (national grant, secondary residences) 
are  robust  and  show  positive  effects  on  municipal  public  spending  per  capita.  Next,  we 
observe  weak  economies  of  scale  in  consumption  and  in  production  as  the  coefficients 
associated  with  the  population  and  the  intercommunity  dummy  variable  are  respectively 




The main purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of the creation of multiple levels of 
local government, which ensues from decentralization, on the size of the total local public 
sector.  Studies  to  date  using  data  from  various  countries  have  found  evidence  of  a 
complementary relation between spending at different levels of local government. 
 
In our study, we use data from 2001 and 2005 that covers the 110 largest municipalities 
(excluding  Paris)  located  in  87  departments  in  France.  First,  we  assume  the  stability  of 
regression coefficients over the observation set, and estimate a spatial error model to capture 
spending interactions among neighboring municipalities. In this step, we also find a strong 
complementary effect. 
 
In a second step, we estimate a demand for local public services specification after controlling 
spatial  heterogeneity.  Two  different  spatial  regimes  models  are  estimated  based  on  inter-
regional differences in France, and the models are then compared. We thus allow cross-region 
parameter variation for the preferences, price and income effects. The specification is based 
on  two  spatial  divisions  of  the  French  territory,  one  into  three  groups  of  regions  (Ile  de 
France/South/North), and one into seven (French European constituencies). 
 
We then assess the importance of spatial heterogeneity in the analysis of the determinants of 
local public expenditures. The spatial regimes specification allows spatial dependence to be 
removed. In addition, the impact of an increase in departmental expenditures on municipal 
spending decisions is assessed differently if regional heterogeneity is present. Results then 
show that municipal and departmental spending decisions are complementary only in Ile de 
France (IDF). Other French regions show either independence or substitution between the 
services offered by the two different overlapping jurisdictions. From the perspective of policy  
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analysis, our results show that a multi-tiered form of organization does not systematically 
increase the total local public spending level. This result might be seen as contributing to the 
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